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Abstract: In recent years maritime logistics infrastructures are the global links among societies and
economies. This challenges adversaries to intrude on the cyber-dependent ICTs by performing
high-level intelligent techniques. A potential cyber-attack on such infrastructures can cause
tremendous damages starting from supply chain service disruption ending up with threatening
the whole human welfare. Current risk management policies embed significant limitations in terms
of capturing the specific security requirements of ICTs and control/monitoring devices, such as
IoT platforms, satellites and time installations, which are primary functioning for the provision of
Maritime Logistics and Supply Chain (MLoSC) services. This work presents a novel risk assessment
methodology capable of addressing the security particularities and specificities of the complex nature
of SCADA infrastructures and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) of the Maritime Logistics Industry.
The methodology identifies asset vulnerabilities and threats to estimate the cyber-risks and their
cascading effects within the supply chain, introducing a set of subsequent security assessment
services. The utilization of these services is demonstrated via a critical, real-life SCADA scenario
indicating how they can facilitate supply chain operators in comprehending the threat landscape
of their infrastructures and guide them how to adopt optimal mitigation strategies to counter or
eliminate their cyber-risks.
Keywords: maritime logistics services; SCADA infrastructures; cyber-physical systems; risk
assessment; cyber-attacks; mitigation strategies; LNG transport
1. Introduction
In the modern era, Maritime Logistics and Supply Chains (MLoSCs) are the blood veins of global
trade and economy where cross-border Critical Infrastructures (CI), such as ports, maritime authorities,
airports, railways, energy providers, banks, maritime logistics and transport companies, collaborate in
offering critical complex services, such as container management, vehicle transport, Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) transport and cruising. The CIs that operate within their MLoSCs have physical and cyber
multi-interdependencies, interacting with all sectors of the economy and therefore, their malfunctioning
or disruption could have cascading effects on several other infrastructures or services depending on it
throughout the global supply chain.
MLoSC services embed physical processes, such as vehicles and cargo stevedoring, ports Plant
power supply procedures, pipeline management during LNG transport, which are monitored
and controlled by composite and heterogeneous Industrial Control Systems (ICS) including
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and
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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Such installations play a vital role in the Maritime Industry
as they analyze and display information aiming to promote a smooth and efficient performance of
maritime logistics operations. SCADA systems, because of their high-level automation mechanisms
and data interpretation capabilities, have managed to reduce waste of time and provide cost savings
in logistics, maritime transport and control operations. In addition, they can gather environmental
information, such as temperature, to protect both Port’s plant and cargoes from physical disasters and
potential industrial hazards [1].
Cargo ships are connected to ports and other MLoSCs operators via a plethora of communication
and data links (e.g., through satellite network or conventional radio channel) and their navigation today
is widely reliant on electronic solutions (e.g., satellite navigation with GPS, Galileo, Radar ARPA-Radio
Direction and Ranging).
MLoSCs can be viewed as complex CPSs composed of heterogeneous, interconnected physical and
cyber assets, owned by different national and foreign CIs, ensuring seamless and swift product/data
exchange from the producer down to the end consumer.
MLoSCs’ interconnected physical and cyber assets are highly valuable and thus lately they have
become targets for attacks [2], attracting the attention of terrorism (e.g., Russian Business Network) [3],
cyber-hacktivism organizations, militias (e.g., Anonymous, LulzSec) [3] and agencies (e.g., Stuxnet,
Flame, Conficker, DuQu, APT1) [3]. In this context, the MLoSCs have garnered front-page attention as
a victim of recent cyber-attacks: (i) A Chinese manufacturer stands accused of implanting malware in
inventory scanners to steal supply chain intelligence [4]; (ii) hackers recently shut down a floating oil
rig by tilting it [5]; (iii) engineering experiments have demonstrated that low-cost GPS jammers can be
used to change a vessel’s course by interfering with its navigation systems (GPS, ECDIS, AIS) causing
a trackline-following autopilot to inaccurately interpret the ship’s position and alter its course [3];
(iv) Somali pirates used hackers to gain access to shipping company’s databases and vessel tracking
systems to identify vessels with valuable cargoes, thus, many ships that transit the Gulf region are
turning their Automatic Identification System (AIS) navigation tracking system off so that pirates
cannot identify, locate and track them [3]; (v) in port of Antwerp, between 2011 and 2013, cyber-attacks
were used to highjack, divert, or steal cargo [3]; (vi) a major maritime company, engaged in a deal
to order a sea floor mining vessel, was the victim of a cyber-attack as it unknowingly pre-paid
($10 million of the $18 million charterer’s guarantee) the deposit into a bank account that belonged to
a cyber-criminal [6].
Attacks on the MLoSC may cause not only disruption of its services but also tremendous damage
to the maritime operations and furthermore to the economies, societies, and environment, threatening
the safety, security and stability within the EU and beyond. For example, an illegal intrusion on the ICS
(e.g., supervisory control, SCADA installations) hosted in ports or maritime transport companies may
lead to the disruption of loading/unloading services or harm critical mechanical devices (e.g., container
cranes, safety and mechanical systems that operate locks and dams), or even worse, cause human
casualties, loss of cargo and serious vessel damages. Another example is an attack on a container
terminal management system causing malfunctions in the intermodal container services involving
maritime, rail and truck transportation. Cyber-attacks (e.g., inserting a malware) in the ports’ SCADA
systems may generate fuel spills and affect water quality; attacks in the Port Community Systems
(PCS) may turn LNG tankers into floating bombs; physical attacks (e.g., bombing) in a dry bulk storage
area of coal products may create and carry dust by wind to tourist terminals or nearby residences.
Due to these threats, there is an urgent, pressing challenge for MLoSCs security officers and
operators to protect their interconnected CIs’, such as SCADA systems (i.e., telemetry systems,
pipelines monitoring system, data collectors, lift stations and gantry crane crowbars) in the new
digital maritime era. Existing risk management policies in EU Ports are using their own disparate
methodologies which hurdles the comparison of risk assessment results among the Member States and
greatens the appearance of cross-border multi-risks across the MLoSC [7]. In addition, the literature
review [7,8] raises the challenge to update and combine security standards, such as NIST800-37 [9],
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ISO27001 [10], ISO27005 [10] and ISO28001 [11]. Furthermore, there is a compelling need for more
targeted Risk Assessment (RA) approaches dealing with the distributed and interconnected nature of
the dynamic, ICT-based MLoSC environments.
The current study aims to present a novel evidence-based risk assessment methodology and
illustrate the utilization of its generated sophisticated RA system, which has been developed under
the EU H2020 Research Project “MITIGATE” [12]. The proposed methodology addresses the
specificities and particularities of MLoSC cyber-assets, such as composite SCADA-based infrastructures
and evaluates their evolving risk landscape by identifying assets interdependencies regarding the
associated threats and cascading effects. To illustrate the level of disruption and damage that can
cause a potential sophisticated cyber-attack to the MLoSC performance and underscore the necessity
of protecting complex maritime logistics infrastructures, such as SCADA systems, we present three
real-life SCADA cyber-attack scenarios on critical services of the MLoSC. Furthermore, to demonstrate
how cybersecurity risks of SCADA installations pertaining the MLoSC can be captured, assessed and
evaluated, we implement the MITIGATE effective, collaborative, standards-based security assessment
services on a relevant SCADA supply chain scenario. To this purpose, all threats arising from the
global supply chain will be considered, including those related to port CIs interdependencies and
associated cascading effects.
Section 2 presents related works. In Section 3 security challenges on Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) are addressed. Section 4 describes the MITIGATE evidence-driven risk assessment methodology
and analyze its security assessment services. Section 5 presents SCADA real-life cyber-attack scenarios
on maritime logistics critical services. Section 6 refers to the utilization of the MITIGATE system
security assessment services on SCADA systems. Section 7 states the evaluation process and findings
of the MITIGATE risk assessment methodology; it presents the limitations of existing RA methods,
highlights corresponding MITIGATE advantages and reports the evaluation findings. Eventually,
Section 8 integrates conclusion and discussion topics.
2. Risk Assessment Methodologies on Contemporary Maritime Logistics Infrastructures
A systemic review has been carried out to identify relevant existing literature on topics
of supply chain security requirements engineering, risk management and supply chain security
management standards of the Maritime Logistics Industry, to adumbrate cutting-edge issues and elicit
important challenges.
Risk Assessment (RA) practices for CPSs have been developed over the past 40 years and they are
still searching for methods to comprehend and facilitate the monitoring of risks [13]. The underlying
principles of RA are captured in the National Academy of Science (Red Book) [14], where assessment
and decision-making are distinguished [15].
With respect to SCADA systems, risk is assumed “a function of the likelihood of a given
threat-source exploiting a potential vulnerability and the resulting impact of a successful exploitation
of the vulnerability” (7). According to ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 definitions [16], security goals are
traditionally categorized into (i) Confidentiality (information is not made available or disclosed to
unauthorized entities); (ii) Integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets) and (iii)
Availability (being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity).
RAs are generally categorized into qualitative, quantitative and hybrid methods, which are a
combination of the first two. Remarkable examples of semi-quantitative RA approaches for maritime
logistics assets are found in the literature, such as the Fault Tree Events Analysis which estimates the
frequency of event occurrence in an undesired (top/root) logical scale [17]. The OBEST object-based
event scenario tree illustrates combined features of event tree analysis and Monte-Carlo discrete event
simulation along with concepts of object-oriented analysis for RA [18]. Schneier [19] introduced
the attack trees as a method to formalize the security of systems and subsystems regarding varying
attacks. A probabilistic-based RA Tool provides a foundation for the estimation of risk reduction when
applied to SCADA security [20]. Augmented vulnerability trees and two new indices for quantifying
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risks were introduced by Graham, Patel, and Ralston [17]. Cheminod et al. [21] have presented the
Quantitative modeling SCADA vulnerabilities CRA. A scenario-based approach to risk analysis in
support of cybersecurity has been introduced [22]. In 2009, a cyber-terrorism SCADA risk framework
has been presented [23].
The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P), founded by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is a research SCADA project for “Unifying Stakeholders and Security
Programs to Address SCADA Vulnerability and Infrastructure Interdependencies” [24], which aims to
raise the security awareness of process control systems.
The key-concepts and impact measurement in SCADA systems, including system (asset),
vulnerability, threat impact (consequence) and security control-countermeasure have been
identified [8,24–27]. Cherdantseva et al. [8] have highlighted considerable risk assessment approaches
on SCADA systems ranging from 2004 to 2014, stemming from the following countries: USA, Korea,
France, Canada, China, Australia, Serbia, Ireland, and Italy. Cardenas et al. [28] cover the scope
broader than RA and also describe modules for attack detection and automated response to an
attack. Ten et al. [29] is a considerable research work introducing the four components of the security
framework for SCADA systems: Real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analysis and
mitigation strategies. Byres et al. [30] illustrate the use of attack trees for assessing vulnerabilities
in SCADA systems and control hardware. Significant research is carried out on assessing the Byres
attack trees, to estimate vulnerabilities in SCADA systems based on MODBUS and MODBUS/TCP
communication protocols and reckon the features of the topmost attack event investigating possible
ways to achieve the final goal of the attack [8]. The literature shows that machine learning,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data mining technologies are thoroughly utilized in SCADA Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) to identify threats. In general, a strong reason is their ability to treat a variety
of historical data sets, which improves the IDS performance [31]. Indicative research works on such
SCADA IDS recognizing malicious traffic can be found in [31–33].
Haimes and Horowitz [34] describe the eight-phase process risk filtering, ranking,
and management method (RFRM) which builds on an adaptive two-player Hierarchical Holographic
Modeling (HHM) method to identify risks. The approach updates on the advances in probabilistic RA
that can be applied to estimate the risk (exposure or expected loss) from SCADA and DCS installations.
To delineate risk assessment processes, there are various attempts to structure ontologies for
general risk assessments, such as the AURUM system [35]. The OCTAVE method [36] is a priori
distribution referring to subjectively estimated probabilities according to the Bayesian approach
using UML modeling language. The CORAS [37] method allows the integration of several different
risk assessment processes the recognition of the probability of an attack is done a priori to any risk
assessment and not automatically. The MEDUSA’s research method [38] sets a number of concepts,
algorithms, and tools evolved from research, specially designed to protect the IT infrastructure and
associated systems.
Standards and norms range from general considerations and guidelines for risk management
processes, such as ISO 31000:2009 [39], ISO 31010 [39], ONR 49000:2004 [40], to specific guidelines for
the IT sector; ISO 20000 [41], ISO 27000 [10], ISO/IEC 27005:2013 [10], ISO 27001:2005 [10], ISO/IEC
27005:2011 [10], NIST2002 [42], NIST800-37 [9], NIST800-30 [43], BSI: IT-Grundschutz catalogues [44]
and to highly specific frameworks, such as EC725/2004 [45], CISSP/ICS 2015 [46], IMO04 [47],
ISO 20858 [48] of the maritime sector. Most of these standards specify framework conditions for
the risk management process but rarely go into detail on specific methods to analyze and assess
cyber-risks, making it difficult to delineate a direct comparison of results among several and varied
risk assessment applications. However, the CISSP/ICS 2015 certification provides some directions for
risk calculation. The EU Directive (2015/C261/03) [49], “Risk Management Capability Assessment
Guidelines” sets RA impact clarifications for CIs of the Energy and Transport sectors, which impedes
the assessment of all vital services provided by CIs.
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Summarizing, the literature shows that effective cost-benefit analysis and evaluation of SCADA
cyber-risks are based on a straightforward approach combining a set of parameters and features,
such as the likelihood of security events, the consequences of the event itself and the exploitation
level of vulnerability [50]. The current work will present how the Mitigate security assurance services
implementation justifies this approach using rational decision-making techniques.
3. Security Challenges in Industrial Control Systems
ICSs in the Maritime Logistics Industry encompass SCADA, DCSs, and PLCs. They are found
in the dockside container cranes, straddle-carriers and autonomous vehicles supporting stevedoring
procedures and transporting containers in a commercial port with GPS and optical recognition port
operations [51]. In addition, they are used in the bulk liquid and dry cargo handling systems that load
and unload grain, crude oil, diesel, toxic chemicals and LNG. ICSs are also found aboard the support
vessels such as pilot boats, tugboats, fireboats and oil spill response vessels, which ensure the safe
movement of vessels and their cargo while entering and leaving a commercial port and monitor their
safety while berthed at passenger and cargo terminals. Most ICSs began as proprietary, stand-alone
systems that were separated from the rest of the world and isolated from most external threats.
However, more recent SCADA systems have moved to more interoperability and open standards
for cost efficiency and integration into management IT systems. For example, communication is
now common over Ethernet TCP-IP including more standardized control protocols and applications.
Open standards for SCADA systems are sources for adversaries to gain knowledge regarding
the SCADA network topology [52]. Hence, SCADA systems are subject to external attacks and
IT-based vulnerabilities.
Contemporary SCADA technologies used in the maritime logistics sector depend on position
and monitoring (e.g., IoT devices like cameras sending information to IT assets, navigation given
by satellite terminals) and timing [51]. Maritime logistics, as other industries, faces cybersecurity
issues due to the lack of management awareness, incomplete knowledge of attacks and SCADA asset
vulnerabilities, focusing more on physical security measures neglecting to arrange cybersecurity drills
to train SCADA operators [53,54]. Summarizing, there is a strong need to enhance the cyber-threat
awareness of SCADA systems within the MLoSC [53,54].
As SCADA control systems become increasingly complex, distributed and interdependent with
other sectors [51] the number of potential attack vectors also increases, including via the internet,
enterprise network, and direct connections to the control networks and field devices. Some of the most
common types of attack vectors against SCADA are Backdoors and holes in the network perimeter;
Attacks on field devices; Database attacks; Communications hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks;
Cinderella attack on time provision and synchronization. The types of attacks on SCADA systems
fall into five main categories [54]: (i) On the Communication stack attacks can occur for example on
the network layer via a diagnostic server); (ii) on the UDP port attacks can occur on the transport
layer, such as a SYN flood attack saturating resources by sending TCP connection requests faster than
the machine can process them; (iii) at application layer intrusions can happen as a lack of security
control to many of the SCADA protocols (e.g., DNS forgery and packet replay are common); (iv) on
the hardware attacks may occur, for example, when adversaries manage to obtain unauthenticated
remote access to devices and change data set points that may cause the devices to fail at low threshold
or an alarm not to go off. Lack of authentication for administrative tasks on the hardware means
that an attacker can reprogram the logic or values and affect the functional behavior of the device;
(v) on the software a cyber-attack can occur because SCADA systems use a variety of software to
provide functionality from traditional IT applications to bespoke embedded device applications and
more accumulated memory fragmentation, which can lead to programs stalling. Structured Query
Language (SQL) is widely used to store sensor information in historians and other databases, thus,
if not designed properly at the application level the systems are susceptible to SQL injection attacks.
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Given the complexity of the SCADA systems infrastructure and how composite the cybersecurity
assessment is, this may be an expensive outlay to deal with [51]. Another focal point is that Information
Systems and SCADA operating infrastructures are directly linked and cyber-dependent. Thus, modern
RAs methodologies must take into account this linkage when evaluating SCADA cyber-risks [51] and
mind the cross-sector dependencies [7], which facilitate the entry points to access the SCADA network.
Industrial Internet of things, because of its extending internet connectivity, is a new big challenge,
requiring advanced security measures to be undertaken to protect it from cyber-threats, in which the
latest communication protocols should be considered.
Social media communication capability in the operation of SCADA technical systems,
with phenomena such as alerts or spurious news on hazards, dangers, opportunities, such as false fire
alarm, may distort the level of response in operational and emergency situations [5]. Consequently,
a successful RA approach for SCADA CIs may have the characteristics listed below:
• A structured body of cybersecurity knowledge using Knowledge Management practices to
organize the knowledge [13,55].
• Adoption of business modeling and simulation techniques to carry out different real-life
cyber-attack scenarios and experiment with the results [7,55].
• Taking into account rational decision-making techniques for probabilistic RAs of complex
cyber-attack scenarios.
• Identify common or cross-border scenarios throughout national and regional limits [7].
• Involvement of all CI operators, including entities of both public and private sector participating,
in order to have a clear and detailed view of SCADA cyber-risks at the asset-individual level
and to identify the overall cyberdependencies across SCADA Networks and hence detecting the
impact at the system level [55].
• Be compliant with regulations and directives or international standards applying to the supply
chain (e.g., IMO practices and ISO standards).
• Introduce collaborative practices to facilitate the sharing and transfer of risk-related information
across supply chain operators.
Moreover, there is the need for new risk and resilience assessment approaches that may assess
and demonstrate the ability to develop and implement effective RA strategies and ensure SCADA
systems resilience against aftermath cyber-incidents. The MITIGATE security assurance services
are capable of responding to these requirements. The current work aims to raise MLoSCs operators’
awareness of ICS security and assist them in learning how to recognize and react to an ICS cybersecurity
SCADA incident.
4. The MITIGATE Supply Chain Risk Assessment Methodology
MITIGATE is the product of a research project [12], co-funded by the European Commission
under its biggest Research and Innovation program Horizon 2020. The acronym “MITIGATE”
stands for multidimensional, integrated, risk assessment framework and dynamic, collaborative
Risk Management tools for critical information infrastructures.
4.1. An Evidence-Driven Holistic Approach
The MITIGATE methodology is a dynamic, collaborative, standards-based risk management
methodology for all maritime logistics actors of the global supply chain protecting CIs from
cyber-criminal activities [56]. This RA approach deals with MLoSC infrastructures and can
be respectively applied to SCADA systems to assess their cyber-risks. Its dynamic and
collaborative notion derives from an evidence-driven Maritime Supply Chain Risk Assessment
(MSCRA) holistic approach [56–58], which is implemented towards a step-by-step risk management
methodology providing an holistic view of maritime logistics infrastructures and their supply
chains, enabling cooperation and risk-handling transparency among supply chain stakeholders and
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generating unique evidence about risk assessment and mitigation. This is achieved by an open
simulation environment that allows the business partners to simulate risks and evaluate risk mitigation
actions. To estimate the cascading and escalating effects of risks, threats and vulnerabilities of the
ICT-based supply chains, the MITIGATE methodology uses specialized metrics and measurements.
The identification and analysis of composite interdependencies between supply chain entities and
their cyber-assets drive the process of assessing the propagation of incidents through multiple ICT
networks. An application of game-theoretic algorithms yields the recognition of optimal mitigation
actions, capturing a worst-case scenario damage for the defender, based on the game-theoretic risk
management approach described in Reference [59], the mathematical module for uncertain payoffs
described in Reference [60] and potential attack strategies presented in References [57,58,61]. In this
context, the MITIGATE methodology focuses on the following objectives:
• To assess a given supply chain service at the asset individual level
• To promote a rigorous, rational approach that gathers, critically appraises and uses high-quality
research information (produced either by well-defined simulation experiments or available online
repositories and social media)
• To disclose new cyber-threats and thus enhance the risk assessment process
• To identify and measure all relevant cyber threats
• To evaluate the individual, cumulative and propagated vulnerabilities of IT infrastructures
• To estimate the existence of zero-day exploitable vulnerabilities
• To predict all possible attacks/threats paths
• To assess the possible impacts
• To derive and prioritize the corresponding risks and
• To formulate a proper mitigation strategy.
The methodology of design is compliant with a range of international standards (e.g., ISO27k
and ISO28k families and ISPS code), capitalizing on them and other well-known and proven
guidelines and good practices [15] and following standardized notations. Beyond the aforementioned
standards and guidelines, the MITIGATE approach has taken into consideration, additionally,
concepts coming from past projects and existing tools: The MEDUSA supply chain risk assessment
methodology [38], Secure Tropos (e.g., the security modeling) [62] and AECID (e.g., informational
interdependency types) [63].
4.2. A Novel Integrated Risk Management System and Services
Despite the importance of CIs and dynamic ICT-based assets for port operations, according
to the literature, risk management methodologies for maritime logistics environments pay limited
attention to the cyber-security nature of their infrastructures and do not adequately address the security
requirements of the business processes associated with global supply chains. Motivated by these
limitations, MITIGATE introduces, integrates, validates and commercializes a novel Risk Management
(RM) system [64], which empowers stakeholders’ collaboration for the identification, assessment and
mitigation of risks associated with cybersecurity assets and supply chain processes. The MITIGATE RA
approach can be utilized on SCADA infrastructures to assess their cyber-risks. This is demonstrated
via an indicative example presented in Section 6. The MITIGATE system achieves its objectives through
a bouquet of subsequent security assessment services, which integrate a number of activities ranging
from asset identification, impact and threat analysis to the specification of the existing controls and the
disclosure, evaluation and treatment of the inherent and interdependent risks. Thereby, the MITIGATE
system supports the following flexible and configurable self-driven security assessment services:
• Security Assessment Service 1 (SAS-1): Supply Chain Service Modeling
• Security Assessment Service 2 (SAS-2): Vulnerabilities Management and Open Intelligence
• Security Assessment Service 3 (SAS-3): Threats/Controls Management and Open Intelligence
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• Security Assessment Service 4 (SAS-4): Threat Scenarios Specification
• Security Assessment Service 5 (SAS-5): Supply Chain Risk Analysis
• Security Assessment Service 6 (SAS-6): Attack Paths Simulation
• Security Assessment Service 7 (SAS-7): Supply Chain Risk Management
• Security Assessment Service 8 (SAS-8): Social Engineering and Open Intelligence
4.2.1. Supply Chain Service Modelling (SAS-1)
The MITIGATE methodology addresses the cybersecurity requirements of the business processes
encompassing the MLoSC performance through the modeling of the MLoSC services. This is
achieved by adopting knowledge management practices, which analyze in-depth inter-organizational
and cross-organizational key-concepts of MLoSC critical services: Key-management processes,
participating business partners and operating CPSs. The aforementioned approach implements
a combined technique of process-centric and asset-centric views analyzed in Reference [55].
The process-centric view, depicted in Figure 1, defines the business processes and business
partners’ participation and collaboration in the provision of the supply chain service whereas the
cyber-asset view, shown in Figure 2, identifies the cyber-assets operation and their interrelation within
the supply chain service.
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Consequently, this security assessment service delivers a cyber-asset inventory including all
computing (desktops, notebooks, servers) and networking related devices (switches, routers, etc.),
printers, appliances (network attached storage, network capable cameras, etc.), applications and
IT systems in general owned, managed, or otherwise used by the maritime logistics operators.
Such devices are vessel traffic monitoring systems, intermodal maritime-based logistics,
SCADA components, such as Human Machine Interface (HMI), Master Terminal Unit (MTU),
Programming Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory stations, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs),
sensor systems for controlling stevedoring equipment, such as gantry cranes, trailers and forklifts [54].
The modeling of supply chain services elicits information about the main cyberdependencies
that exist among assets. A cyberdependency of assets is considered a pair cyber-asset (node)
interrelation and/or interconnection (edge) aiming to fulfil an electronic service/operation across
communication networks [55,59]. The MITIGATE methodology assumes a twofold dependency
concept: (i) The dependency type and (ii) the dependency access vector. The dependency type
identifies the manner in which a cyber-asset pair is interdependent in a supply chain service:
1. Hosting; 2. Exchange data/information; 3. Storing; 4. Controlling; 5. Processing; 6. Accessing;
7. Installing; 8. Trusted; 9. Connecting. The cyber-asset pair consists of a source cyber-asset and a
destination cyber-asset. The dependency access vector defines the location the two cyber-assets are
able to interact through a communication network within the supply chain: Adjacent Network (A),
Local (L), Network (N) [34,55,56]. This allows the MLoSC operators to understand how these assets
are used and cooperate. Additionally, the MITIGATE service provides a visualization of the entire
infrastructure, which expands the cyber-assets knowledge and improves the data sharing of the
spectrum [55].
4.2.2. Vulnerabilities Management and Open Intelligence (SAS-2)
Organizations involved in the MLoSC should be aware of the vulnerabilities associated with the
cyber-assets of their IT infrastructures. This service acts as a central repository for all known and
unknown/undisclosed vulnerabilities. It makes use of open data sources, such as the CVE Details
portal [65] where these vulnerabilities have been disclosed, replicating all the confirmed and known
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 1477 10 of 32
vulnerabilities and associating them with the affected assets via synchronization and knowledge
management mechanisms. Unknown/undisclosed vulnerabilities can be, additionally, declared and
treated by business partners. To quantify vulnerabilities, a set of metrics is taken into account as listed
below [65]:
• The access vector showing how vulnerability can be exploited.
• The attack complexity illustrating how easy or difficult is to exploit the discovered vulnerability.
• The authentication describing the number of times that an attacker must authenticate to a target
to exploit it.
• The confidentiality outlining the impact on the confidentiality of data processed by the asset.
• The availability describing the impact on the availability of the target asset.
• The integrity describes the impact on the integrity of the exploited asset.
4.2.3. Threats/Controls Management and Open Intelligence (SAS-3)
The digital era presses supply chain operators and organizations involved in the MLoSC to
be highly knowledgeable about the threat landscape their IT infrastructure is exposed to. Hence,
they should be armed with the appropriate tools and solutions that could help them familiarize
themselves with the threats that may affect their organizations and the security controls that can
be either deployed or applied in order to mitigate the risks and confront the defined threats and
weaknesses. In this context, the MITIGATE system acts as a knowledge base of identified threats
indicating corresponding mitigation controls that can be used to counter such cybersecurity issues.
This service adopts the CAPEC classification of MITRE [66], which synchronizes the MITRE
attack identifiers and associates the identified vulnerabilities with one or more weakness identifiers.
Custom threats can be declared by supply chain business partners. Furthermore, the service supports
the creation and customization of security controls, which are categorized into two types: “Mitigates
Threats” and “Mitigates Vulnerabilities”.
4.2.4. Threat Scenarios Specification (SAS-4)
The interconnectivity and heterogeneity of ICT systems foster the frequent emergence of
new, complex threats and vulnerabilities. As cybercriminals continue to do the unexpected by
discovering new ways to break into ICT processes and SCADA operations, the nature of cyber-attacks
within the MLoSC is becoming even more targeted, sophisticated and ingenious. Against this
background, the MITIGATE system serves threat scenario specification to help MLoSC operators
realize the consequences deriving from the identified threats and vulnerabilities on their cyber-assets.
Threat scenario is assumed a use-case in which a threat can compromise an asset by exploiting
vulnerabilities and weaknesses as well as taking advantage of the lack of adequate security controls.
The MITIGATE service provides the capability to declare statically the mapping of threats and
vulnerabilities with assets to increase the cybersecurity awareness of MLoSC operators. Figure 3
illustrates the threat scenarios declaration in the MITIGATE system.
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4.2.5. Supply Chain Risk Analysis (SAS-5)
This MITIGATE service provides guidance to the MLoSC operators to assess and organize the
cybersecurity issues associated with the supply chain services in which they are involved. Moreover,
the MITIGATE system encompasses and executes an evaluation process that implements the main
steps of the proposed MSCRA approach [56–58,61]. Furthermore, MLoSC operators, such as Port
employees, SCADA operators, forwarders, Port Authorities, shipping and carrier agencies, can use this
service to identify and measure all relevant cyber threats, vulnerabilities, assess the possible impacts
and derive and prioritize the corresponding risks. In particular, the MITIGATE MSCRA approach
estimates the cyber-assets’ risk exposure concerning the following three main types of risks: (i) The
individual risk, which represents how dangerous a threat is to a specific cyber-asset within a supply
chain service; (ii) the cumulative risk, which estimates the risk exposure of the successful exploitation
of multiple vulnerabilities, in order to reach a specific cyber-asset within the supply chain service
starting from different entry points and (iii) the propagated risk, which shows how deep into the
supply chain service an attacker may penetrate in case he successfully exploits vulnerabilities found in
asset entry points dealing with threats.
Risk Assessment is initiated on the cyber-assets declared on the supply chain processes pertaining
to the MLoSC services, identified during the execution of the supply chain service modeling. MLoSC
operators are able to assess the risks on their cyber-assets operating in supply chain processes, which are
either directly defined from them or realized by other business partners in which they have been
invited and accepted to participate via the MITIGATE system collaborative environment.
The Supply Chain Risk Analysis service supports two types of risk assessment: “Real” and
“Simulation”. The key difference is that simulation allows MLoSC operators to further customize
their cyber-assets by changing the security information on them; disregard certain vulnerabilities and
threats, amend the threat probability indicators and add more or replace security controls while the
“Real” risk assessment type does not permit such alterations. Furthermore, the simulation mode offers
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a virtual playground where asset cartography has been cloned and thus it permits to run dynamically
different mitigation strategies without affecting the status of the real asset inventory.
The security assessment service delivers a detailed summary of the calculated risks at asset
individual level, as presented in Figure 4. Cyber-assets operating in the selected supply chain process
are presented in a lexicographical order. For each asset, the operator can see the individual risk
level, defined previously, which is calculated per vulnerability along with the associated threat
category. Moreover, the mapping of attacker’s capability with respect to the asset-vulnerability
combination provides the likelihood that an attacker may be able to exploit a specific vulnerability.
This estimation relies on a qualitative nature of a five-tier nominal scale, which is thoroughly analyzed
in References [56–58]: (i) “Very High” (VH) risk is expected to occur within the assets of the business
partner with very high probability and an incident has been realized more than once in the last year
(12 month period); (ii) “High” (H) risk is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner
with high probability and an incident has been realized once in the last 1 year (12 month period);
(iii) “Moderate” (M) risk is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with moderate
probability, where more than one incident has been realized over the last 2 years; (iv) “Low” (L) risk is
expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with low probability, where at most one
incident has been realized over the last 2 years; (v) “Very Low” (VL) risk is expected to occur within
the assets of the business partner with very low probability, where at most one incident or no incident
has been realized over the last 3 years.
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To classify the asset’s risk, the worst-case scenario of the vulnerability risks per asset is used
to introduce the “Dominant Individual Risk Level”, which is additionally visualized by a Risk
Analysis Diagram.
Besides, the operator can see for each asset the threat’s dominant risk level, which is the maximum
risk of all vulnerabilities under a particular threat. The “Threat Analysis” diagram illustrates a count
of different threats that contribute to the asset’s risk level classification.
4.2.6. Attack Paths Simulation (SAS-6)
MLoSC interdependent assets can be increasingly affected by multi-stage targeted cyber-attacks
(such as Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame) using this cross-organizational dependency as a stepping stone to
reach the actual target. MITIGATE implements an attack-path discovery method [57,58,61] that relies on
unique characteristics, such as the attacker’s location, the attacker’s capability, assets interdependencies
and which the entry and target points are in order to return all attack paths that exist in the
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examined supply chains. The service supports the calculation and rendering of all the relevant
attack graphs representing the different paths a cyber-attacker can follow to reach and harm a target
asset. The operator can see all the potentially affected assets and their individual relationships.
This attack path generation and visualization (Figure 5) is carried out by the execution of
rule-based reasoning mechanisms that develop all alternative chains of sequential vulnerabilities
on the examined cyber-assets following an attack-path discovery method. It is a logic rule-based
reasoning approach, which basically consists of the attacker profile, the attacker location and each
association rules that are executed to build the attack graph and generate the paths. In addition, it relies
on two components; (i) the knowledge base component and (ii) the path construction component.
A further description of the approach is presented in References [57,58,61].
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4.2.7. Supply Chain Risk Management (SAS-7)
The vulnerabilities trees, produced during the Attack Path Simulation Service, expose the risks
embedded in the individual cyber-assets and in the entire supply chain. Thereupon, the MLoSC
business partners require guidelines recommending the selection of the most appropriate security
controls and indicating optimization practices, to minimize the expected damage. In this vein,
the MITIGATE assures an acceptable risk level for the collaborative business partners and the overall
MLoSC. In particular, the proposed system provides the necessary defensive capabilities and supports
a rational decision-making to determine which security controls must be implemented and which
partners need to implement them to encounter the identified security issues and cyber-risks. Since all
defence strategies and the corresponding payoffs have been determined, the game-theoretic algorithm
implementation, which is analytically presented in References [59,60], delivers an optimal way of
selecting actions both of the attacker and defender. This equilibrium has a twofold notion: (i) To
protect the assets by adopting the proper proposed security measures that eliminate the damage;
(ii) to identify the highest damage an adversary may cause to the business partner and indicate the
defense strategy that deviates the attacker from this optimal solution providing the minimum business
partner’s loss. To this end, the worst case scenario of damage within the supply chain service is
described. Summarizing, MITIGATE recommends to maritime logistics organizations the performance
of the following activities, in order to manage the MLoSC’s cyber-risks:
• Review the risk assessment results and focus on assets with high individual risk; highlight the
responsible vulnerabilities and the applicable security controls.
• Run attack path analysis scenarios setting (i) high-risk assets as entry points (e.g., GIS web
services, malware SCADA supervisory workstations, etc.) (ii) cyberdependencies as targets.
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 1477 14 of 32
Then, explore the paths and the vulnerabilities that contribute more to the cumulative risk on the
cyberdependencies. Mitigating these will limit the potential impact imposed on the collaborating
business partners. In addition, attack path analysis can be carried out setting cyberdependencies
as entry points and study the propagated sub-graph.
• Mitigation Strategy Selection. Select the security controls of choice and build different defensive
strategies. The game theoretic module will evaluate them and return the optimal results.
4.2.8. Social Engineering and Open Intelligence (SAS-8)
World Wide Web is full of cybersecurity-related content. Social media like Twitter and Reddit,
as well as security blogs, RSS feeds and general-purpose websites, contain invaluable information
about disclosed vulnerabilities, cyber-threats, exploitation methods and security controls. The Open
Intelligence service captures information from various sources and repositories, analyzes and correlates
their content with cybersecurity concepts and stores the results for further browsing and processing.
This Social Engineering and Open Intelligence procedures can be managed by adding, editing or
deleting sources, specifying the media source and search-keyword. The MITIGATE system consults the
inherent list in further data gathering job executions and provides an enhanced result set. A remarkable
example of the open intelligence service is shown in Figure 6.
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Hence, the service provides the “Open Intelligence News”, where MLoSC operators can view
cybersecurity news relevant to their assets. The Assets’ CPE identifier is used in particular to define the
relevance of a new entry with the business partner’s asset inventory. Further, searching is allowed via
the available filters (time-range, free-text) and the “Search” button. “Open Intelligence Search” allows
operators to explore content without applying the asset inventory relevance filter described previously.
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5. Attack Scenarios on Real-life Maritime Logistics and Supply Chain Services
This section aims to illustrate how the performance of MLoSCs can be threatened and disrupted
by cybercriminals. It stresses the need for providing security assessment methods that can increase
the cybersecurity awareness of MLoSC operators’ for supply chain’s SCADA Infrastructures and can
advise them how to protect their assets against potential cyber-attacks or eliminate the security damage
in case an attack occurs. This is presented by exploring cyber-attack scenarios that have been either
reported or known or assumed or suspected against real-life MLoSC services: The Container Cargo
Management, the Vehicle Transport and the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Transport.
The selected services have been identified as critical to the Maritime Logistics Industry due
to security and economic reasons. The criteria for selecting these Critical Services satisfy the
hereunder prerequisites:
• European level nature: Implemented on large, European commercial ports.
• Economic enablers: Address high economic impact across the EU Maritime Logistics Industry
and the whole European economy.
• Environmental value: Meet the EU environmental requirements and standards.
The selected MLoSC Services can be subject to a number of possible threat scenarios that
can be realized by conducting a combination/series of specific cyber-attacks in various MLoSCs’
SCADA CPSs. Hence, malicious users/adversaries are able to realize complex threat scenarios for the
purpose of disrupting MLoSCs’ operations or facilitating illegal activities aimed at obtaining financial,
political/military or even ideological gain and benefits. For example, adversaries may manage to
smuggle illegal material of any kind (e.g., drugs, weapons) or illegal immigrants, or destroy a CI of the
MLoSC by interrupting and modifying its services, gaining access to it either locally or remotely to
take advantage of the system’s security-sensitive operations. To this end, three credible cyber-attack
scenarios against the aforementioned critical MLoSC services are described sequentially.
5.1. Cyber-Attack on SCADA Systems of the Container Cargo Management Service
According to Eurostat 184/2016 statistics, the containerized freight represents almost the third
part of total trade exchanges measured in monetary value. On the other hand, the percentage of
maritime transport in relation to total transported is even higher when kilometres or tonne-kilometres
are measured. Consequently, these references are pointing out the important role of container terminals
in the international carriage of goods. Containers-uniform boxes that can be easily moved between
a lorry, a train and a ship have reshaped global trade over the past few decades.
A terrorist group wants to carry out a terrorist attack at a port in order to inflict wide-scale death
and destruction by placing a bomb in a container, shipping it to the target port and detonating it before
it could be inspected. The terrorist group is aware that a name-brand company ships containers of
products and other cargoes to this port. The containers on any given ship are packed at the factories
of the company; the container doors are shut and a mechanical seal is put into the door pad-eyes.
A transportation company has undertaken the responsibility to pick up the container and transfer it to
a container vessel. However, the containers are not delivered directly from the name-brand company’s
premises to the port terminal; rather, they go through a third party, a container packing warehouse.
The terrorists are aware of that the deliveries are managed through an IT system at the container
packing warehouse; thus they cooperated with skilled hackers who can infiltrate the IT environment
of the third party and gain access to the container management system. The terrorists change the
information of the shipping container in order to replace it with another one carrying a bomb, which has
been already placed by the terrorist group in the container packing warehouse.
Alternatively, the hackers could target any RFID tags and sensors attached to the container to
monitor the goods. Such RFID kits are usually used to monitor various: (i) safety-oriented features
such as whether the container door is opened or closed, the temperature inside the container, etc. or
(ii) national security concerns like the illegal transportation of radioactive material and/or chemicals
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used in bomb construction. Each container’s RFID tag transmits its ID number and sensor data to an
RFID reader, which then forwards that information (e.g., via a GSM base station) to an onboard control
system and finally to the system administrator. The hackers could remotely exploit these RFID tags
and sensors by injecting their own malware so that they transmit falsified information for the cargo
of the targeted container. Even worse, they can manipulate the tags of other legitimate containers to
make them look as if they hold suspicious cargo instead of the actual malevolent container.
At the target port, the security authorities inspect containers that the screening identifies as
suspicious, based on ports of call, manifest data, shipping company, etc. In order for the terrorists to
circumvent the authorities and bypass the inspection process, they compromise the IT infrastructure of
the port and gain access to the container shipping system that keeps the routing or scheduling of the
containers. Hence, they can change the container’s details in the system and place the container in
the desired location so that the detonation of the bomb could cause the maximum number of injuries
and deaths.
5.2. Cybercriminals Attack OBUs during Vehicle Transport
The Vehicle Transport is a relatively long and complex service supported by numerous players,
such as shippers and port authorities, involving the shipment and receipt of various types of
vehicles and equipment, such as container terminals, trucks, gantry cranes and providers of Dockers.
The service involves domestic and international transportation, such as warehouse management,
order and inventory control, materials handling, import/export facilitation, and information
technology. In this vein, the Vehicle Transport affects multiple sectors across the global supply chain.
A criminal gang aims to steal vehicles from the vehicle terminal of a port. To achieve this,
hired hackers engage malicious activities spanning from simple phishing attacks, targeting port
authorities and key employees, to the exploitation of more sophisticated, remote malware targeting
the onboard communication interfaces and units of the pointed vehicles.
By launching a series of cyber-attacks, the adversaries manage to compromise few computers and
critical elements based on software-related vulnerabilities and dynamic memory errors criteria. Thus,
they manage to get access to the vehicle’s vast network of interconnected On-Board Units (OBUs)
and eventually spoof their geolocation. Examining the in-port vehicle scheduling processes followed,
the criminals can then change the route and the location of the vehicles, to their preferred points of
interest, without the port system administrator detecting any of these changes. In addition, the hackers
could exploit vulnerabilities in the surveillance system of the port that controls the CCTV video
cameras in order to gain access and delete video streams that show their malicious activities. Such a
synergy of various attack paths against the CPSs reflects the investigation that will be performed
following the MITIGATE methodology to exam the different types of vulnerabilities that may lead to
the proposition of appropriate mitigation strategies.
5.3. Intrusion Scenario on the Oil Monitoring System of the LNG Transport Service
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas, predominantly methane, CH4 that has been
converted to liquid form for ease of storage or transport. It is odorless, colorless, non-toxic and
non-corrosive. Hazards include flammability after vaporization into a gaseous state, freezing and
asphyxia. Considering that a tanker contains more than one hundred thousand cubic meters of LNG,
it represents a potential explosive hazard comparable to a nuclear bomb.
A terrorist group seeks to cause significant human casualties, economic losses and environmental
damages by attacking the LNG land-based facilities of a port or an LNG tanker. For example, a possible
cyber-attack to LNG land-based infrastructure may cause catastrophic fires either inside the port or
even nearby populated areas and an LNG tanker attack may result in a major spill that could pose a
hazard to coastal communities along the tanker’s route. Furthermore, a physical attack on the LNG
storage facilities, either in the form of bombing or by impacting a vehicle in the facility, may cause an
explosion that leads to a widespread fire jeopardizing people’s lives within the port.
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Therefore, we assume that a terrorist group commits a cyber-attack during LNG shipping as
follows. A shipping company receives an e-mail purportedly coming from the IT company that
supports and maintains its ICT infrastructure asking them to download and install a software that
improves the performance of their systems. In this way, the terrorists successfully download and
execute arbitrary code on the victims’ systems to gain access to them.
Accordingly, the terrorists can leverage their access to go deep into the network by exploiting
vulnerabilities in the oil company’s monitoring software that provides remote tank monitoring, asset
tracking, and data reporting services to break into the system. Therefore, they can empty the oil tank
without being detected.
6. How to Utilize the MITIGATE Security Assessment Services
The security assessment services of the MITIGATE system can be utilized to support SCADA
CPSs of MLoSC services and protect them against malicious activities, such as those described
previously. Hereunder, is presented how MLoSC business partners can utilize the MITIGATE services
to estimate cyber-risks on maritime logistics SCADA infrastructures and discover mitigation strategies
to encounter cybersecurity issues. This is illustrated by applying the MITIGATE security assessment
services in an indicative scenario of SCADA cyber-assets considered to operate within the critical
service of the LNG Transport, mentioned previously. The demonstration is given in a sequential report,
aiming to provide a thorough and comprehensive perspective of the MITIGATE utilities towards a
supply chain service. According to the scenario, a number of business partners, such as a Local Agent
of a maritime logistics company, a Greek Port Authority, a Spanish Port Authority and a Gas Shipping
Company, collaborate for the provision of the LNG Transport Service and they are highly dependent
on the combined use of the port’s physical (i.e., facilities, buildings, cranes, pipelines, rail track,
roads, data centers) and cyber infrastructure (i.e., networks, ICT hardware equipment, communication
systems, access control/authentication of users and containers). These four MLoSC business partners
have signed a Security Declaration Statement, which is a documented commitment of each partner
to exchange any security-related information and data concerning the LNG Transport Service and
report any security risks or information related to the provision of this service. This information
includes the security measures implemented on their infrastructures, how CPSs of LNG Transport
are safeguarded and how their accompanying information is protected. The security measures are
demonstrated and verified.
In particular, the business partners use the security assessment services of the MITIGATE system
to assess their SCADA components, identify individual cyber-risks and evaluate the corresponding
propagated and cascading effects with respect to the entire LNG Transport Service. The goal is to
have a holistic treatment of threats, offering an enhanced understanding of the cyber interfaces for
unidentified vulnerabilities, providing decision-making with an improved assessment of the integrated
risks containing the propagating and cascading effects of the entire supply chain.
6.1. Utilization of SAS-1: LNG Transport Service Modeling
All partners, representing their business entities, use the MITIGATE system to model their
interconnected SCADA cyber-assets, operating in the processes supporting the LNG Transport
Service, such as the LNG Monitoring Service process. The LNG Monitoring Service process refers
to the LNG handling functions of the LNG port terminal and the LNG carrier vessel operating
during the LNG Transport (i.e., pipeline monitoring and fuel monitoring) The MITIGATE system’s
invitation/acceptance functionality facilitates collaboration among business partners to declare their
assets as participating in each specific process (i.e., Figure 7 shows that regarding the LNG Transport
Service, Port Authority has invited the Local Agent to participate and the latter has accepted the
invitation). This refined CI representation of the various cyber-assets and their interconnections is
fundamental towards measuring and assessing their threats and vulnerabilities and the investigation of
scenarios with combined cyber-attacks. The current example presents indicative SCADA components
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of the LNG Transport Monitoring Service process: (i) FUEL monitoring service assets (i.e., software
installed on an operating system) that deliver fuel consumption information for the LNG carrier
vessel; (ii) PLCs that handle the LNG tank capacity; (iii) a MTU, which controls the PLCs using the
Modbus TCP/IP communication protocol; (iv) a Historian Data Server, which records historical data
upon LNG tank capacity and stores in the LNG database center; (v) a HMI, which is considered an
input-output device with a panel view for depicting graphically the process data to human operators
of the engineering workstations; (vi) a SMTP mail server with each mail operating system for the
e-mail communication across the LNG Transport network.
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  17 of 32 
Service, such as the LNG Monitoring Service process. The LNG Monitoring Service process refers to 
the LNG handling functions of the LNG port terminal and the LNG carrier vessel operating during 
the LNG Transport (i.e., pipeline monitoring and fuel monitoring) The MITIGATE system’s 
invitation/acceptance functionality facilitates collaboration among business partners to declare their 
assets as participating in each specific process (i.e., Figure 7 shows that regarding the LNG Transport 
Service, Port Authority has invited the Local Agent to participate and the latter has accepted the 
invitation). This refined CI representation of the various cyber-assets and their interconnections is 
fundamental towards measuring and assessing their threats and vulnerabilities and the 
investigation of scenarios with combined cyber-attacks. The current example presents indicative 
SCADA components of the LNG Transport Monitoring Service process: (i) FUEL monitoring service 
assets (i.e., software installed on an operating system) that deliver fuel consumption information for 
the LNG carrier vessel; (ii) PLCs that handle the LNG tank capacity; (iii) a MTU, which controls the 
PLCs using the Modbus TCP/IP communication protocol; (iv) a Historian Data Server, which 
records historical data upon LNG tank capacity and stores in the LNG database center; (v) a HMI, 
which is considered an input-output device with a panel view for depicting graphically the process 
data to human operators of the engineering workstations; (vi) a SMTP mail server with each mail 
operating system for the e-mail communication across the LNG Transport network. 
 
Figure 7. The “Exchange Data” cyberdependency is declared between the Port Authority and the 
Local Agent accepter business partner as a result of an e-mail exchange. 
To this purpose, the Supply Chain Service Modelling (SAS-1) provides asset mapping (assets 
are characterized based on its cyber-nature; Application, Operating System or Hardware) and asset 
cyberdependency identification (Figure 7), where a set of logical rules are followed that guarantee 
the valid creation of a graph of assets and their cyberdependencies according to the twofold 
dependency concept analyzed in Section 4; an indicative example is presented in Table 1. This allows 
the business partners of the LNG Transport Service to understand assets interrelations within the 
LNG Transport Network. The asset-graph of the LNG Transport Network example is depicted 
previously in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 7. The “Exchange Data” cyberdependency is declared between the Port Authority and the Local
Agent accepter business partner as a result of an e-mail exchange.
To this purpose, the Supply Chain Service Modelling (SAS-1) provides asset mapping (assets are
characterized based on its cyber-nature; Application, Operating System or Hardware) and asset
cyberdependency identification (Figure 7), where a set of logical rules are followed that guarantee the
valid creation of a graph of assets and their cyberdependencies according to the twofold dependency
concept analyzed in Section 4; an indicative example is presented in Table 1. This allows the business
partners of the LNG Transport Service to understand assets interrelations within the LNG Transport
Network. The asset-graph of the LNG Transport Network example is depicted previously in Figure 2.
Table 1. Example of SCADA assets cyberdependencies within the LNG Transport Network.
Asset Source Asset Destination
Dependency Type: 1. Hosting,
2. Exchange, Data, 3. Storing,
4. Controlling, 5. Processing,
6. Accessing, 7. Installing,
8. Trusted 9. Connecting
Dependency Access
Vector: Adjacent
Network (A), Local (L),
Network (N)
LNG—PLC software LNG—PLC OS installing L
SMTP Mail Server Local Agent Mail Server Exchange data N
LNG—PLC LNG—Master Terminal Unit Connecting A
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6.2. Utilization of SAS-2: SCADA Assets Vulnerabilities Management of the LNG Transport Service
A set of metrics is defined to present the vulnerabilities found in the declared assets from
online repositories [65] using open intelligence techniques. The Vulnerability Management Menu
of the MITIGATE system (SAS-2 service) delivers the confirmed vulnerability attributes and it is
capable of creating zero-day exploitable vulnerabilities. Figure 8 shows an example of vulnerability
attributes of confirmed and a created zero-day vulnerability via the Vulnerability Management service
of the MITIGATE system. The presented vulnerabilities are both concern heap-based buffer overflow
weaknesses in the Graphic Device Interface (GDI).
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6.3. Utilization of SAS-3: Threats/Controls Management within the LNG Transport Service
The MITRE CAPEC, synchronizat on services [66] have associated the vuln rabilities identified on
SCADA a sets of the LNG Monitoring service process with one or more weakness identifiers. This is
depicted from the Threat Management menu of the MITIGATE system (Figure 9).Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW  19 of 32 
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Figure 9. Threats Management service of the MITIGATE system showing the threat “Buffer Errors”
(threat ID: CWE-119), which is the corresponding threat of the CVE-2009-2501 vulnerability found on
the LNG Fuel Monitoring Software declared asset.
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6.4. Utilization of SAS-4 Threat Scenarios Specification for LNG SCADA Assets
The “Attack Scenarios Management” environment of the MITIGATE system implements the
mapping of threats and vulnerabilities with assets service. An example of this mapping is illustrated
in Figure 10. The visualized attack scenario concerns the exploitation of vulnerability “CVE-2016-7960”
found on the PLC software declared asset, which corresponds to the “information exposure” threat
(CWE-200).
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Figure 10. The Threat Scenarios Specification service shows a possible threat scenario for the
“PLC software” declared asset of the LNG Transport Service.
The graphic representations of SAS-3 and SAS-4 accordingly have been implemented via business
logic rules on top of a Neo4J database. The formal/normative concepts of Asset, Vulnerability, Threat,
Control element, Vendor, Attack scenario, Impact Level are unified and uniquely represented in the
supportive database schema.
6.5. Utilization of SAS-5: Supply Chain Risk Analysis of the LNG Monitoring Service process
To estimate the cyber-risks of the LNG Monitoring Service supply chain process, we have executed
a simulation type risk assessment on the declared assets. The Supply Chain Risk Analysis service
is capable of estimating cyber-risks for zero-day exploitable vulnerabilities. This is illustrated in
Figure 11.
Figure 12 presents the Risk Analysis diagram of SCADA assets participating in the LNG
Monitoring Service process, whereas Figure 13 shows the Threat Analysis diagram of the
aforementioned assets, providing an indication of how crucial the protection is of an asset-based
not only on the possibility of being attacked but also on the impact of the potential attack. The graphs
depict individual cyber-risk level reports following the qualitative scale described in Section 4.2.5.
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Figure 11. The Supply Chain Risk Analysis service has estimated the individual cyber-risk (VH) of the
Fuel Monitoring software asset due to a zero-day exploitable vulnerability, which has been respectively
counted in all types of cyber-risk estimation.
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Figure 13. The Threat Analysis report diagram supports the Supply Chain Risk Analysis service
presenting threats distribution of the most important threats grouped by their risk level per SCADA
asset declared in the LNG Monitoring Service process.
6.6. Utilization of SAS-6: Attack Paths Simulation Scenarios of the LNG Transport Service SCADA Assets
Once the risk assessment has been performed, additional schemas are created that are inherited
from the unified ones, such as the Attack Paths, simulating the different paths that a hacker can follow
to harm a specific asset. This is supported by the Attack Path Simulation Service in the MITIGATE
system (SAS-6). Figure 14 shows the attack path analysis query results according to different attack path
parameters (i.e., attacker’s profile, attacker’s location, attacker’s capability). For example, the “Local
Attack” path analysis includes the query results for the given entry/target points, assuming that the
attacker is an insider intruding into the Fuel Monitoring system using the local LNG network.
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6.7. Supply Chain Risk Management (SAS-7)
Risk assessment is supported by the Supply Chain Risk Analysis (SAS-5) and the Supply Chain
Risk Management (SAS-7) services in the MITIGATE system. The most complex risk assessment
operations are (a) the ad-hoc calculation of the graph; (b) the replication of the asset mapping per each
business partner; (c) the calculation of the individual risk assessment metrics and (d) the calculation
of the attack chains that are bound to the graph. The MITIGATE RA services deliver various reports,
such as the asset criticality and the most possible attacks per individual asset. In order to explore and
manage the LNG Transport Service cyber risks, we may run alternative attack path analysis scenarios
(depicted in Table 2) setting: (i) high-risk assets as entry points, such as the LNG Database and the
SMTP Mail Server and review the attack path analysis results and (ii) set cyberdependency assets either
as entry or target points and study the attack path sub-graphs. The cumulative risk for each attack path,
according to the qualitative scale presented in Section 4.2.5, is shown in Table 2. For example, the risk
exposure of reaching the specific asset “Fuel Monitoring Software” is “Very High” in case the adversary
succeeds to enter into the LNG Transport Network by attacking the “LNG-SMTP Mail Server”.
Table 2. Alternative Attack Path Analysis scenarios concerning different attack path metrics.
Analysis Path Nodes Cumulative Risk Level (Very High: VH, High: H,Moderate: M, Low: L, Very Low: VL)
LNG spill (Locally)
LNG—Database
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—mailstation DesktopApp1
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—Fuel Monitoring Software
H
LNG spill (Network)
LNG—SMTP Mail Server
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—Fuel Monitoring Software
VH
LNG—SMTP Mail Server
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—HMI software
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—Fuel Monitoring Software
H
Attack on Control Stations
(Network)
LNG—mailstation DesktopApp1
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—HMI software
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—PLC OS
H
LNG—mailstation DesktopApp1
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—Engineering workstation
(LNG Transport Network)→
LNG—PLC OS
H
Despite the individual RA report, another crucial source is the comparison between two RAs that
has been performed on two different dates. Within one process of the MLoSC, many things can be
altered. Initially, an asset can be replaced or even patched. Moreover, additional controls may have
been enforced. Finally, additional vulnerabilities may have been disclosed for one asset. Hence, there is
a business need to compare the output of these RAs regarding a specific process for two different
timestamps (SAS-7). An indicative example of this security assessment utility is presented in Figure 15.
In particular, an RA “LNG MS” simulation service is implemented on the assets of the LNG Monitoring
Service process. Then, a new RA simulation is created and before executed, we set up a security control
that mitigates the threat “Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer”
(CWE-119) on the following specific assets; PLC OS, Fuel Monitoring Workstation and Engineering
Workstation. Additionally, we set up another security control on the asset “LNG-HMI Software”
that mitigates its vulnerabilities. A new RA is then executing (“LNG TS with security controls” RA
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simulation), which depicts that the declared security controls manage to mitigate the threat score on
these SCADA assets, as shown in Figure 15.
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6.8. Social Engineering and Open Intelligence (SAS-8)
The open repositories facilitate the required information during the risk assessment process and
functions are satisfied by the Social Engineering and Open Intelligence MITIGATE service, as presented
in Figure 6. Hence, normative metamodels using XSD notation are fully compatible with de-facto
metamodels (CVE and CPE) providing the freedom to connect with multiple sources using an adapter
pattern. The Open Intelligence Controls sub-service relates mainly to Threats and Controls. Threat and
Attack type are used interchangeably. A threat or vulnerability can be mitigated by a control element.
The MITIGATE system uses the collected operational data describing the configuration of systems
and software (e.g., network topologies and existing vulnerabilities) as well as static data describing the
general risk (e.g., if an identified vulnerability has an exploit that is publicly available). MITIGATE
also requires from the MLoSC security team to specify the (suspected/potential/possible) attacker
profile (e.g., regarding knowledge and skill), the possible attacker source (e.g., from the Web) as well
as the possible attacker targets (e.g., SCADA devices that are critical for the under examination LNG
Transport Service). Accordingly, the MITIGATE would proceed to calculate an attack graph for this
configuration and compute a probabilistic network (Individual, Cumulative and Propagated risks) on
top of this attack graph.
7. Evaluation and Findings
In recent years, complex and heterogeneous CIs developments and their interdependencies
within the Maritime Logistics Industry (i.e., port authorities, customs, shipping agencies and IoT
enterprises) have been dictating the importance of protecting their systems’ integrity and resilience.
Most current risk management policies insufficiently consider the composite nature of ICT-empowered
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infrastructures (i.e., SCADA and AIS systems) and forget to take into account the global supply chain
interdependent environment to define the security processes.
Risk analysis methods have been introduced based on both qualitative (i.e., NIST 800-30 [43],
OCTAVE [36]) and quantitative [20] or combined (ISO 27005 [10]) approaches, which either disregard
or use quite primitive computational techniques that lack exploring and comparing risk assessment
results. Security assurance techniques for large-sized enterprises applied both to composite and basic
systems (i.e., NIST 800-30 [43], IT-Grundschutz [44]) have been presented with limitations in analyzing
management and operational issues and give low collaborative capabilities. Bayesian risk assessment
methodologies (i.e., AURUM [35], OCTAVE [36]) main disadvantages refer to their partial subjectivity,
the need for a potentially vast amount of training data and the difficulty of being applicable to new
situations (subjective choice and Bayesian updates of the a-priori models).
An effective risk assessment approach for SCADA systems may reflect the characteristics
presented in Section 3. In this context, the MITIGATE methodology addresses the following issues:
(i) Complex systems, such as SCADA systems, require the collaboration and interaction of supply
chain stakeholders and their cooperating systems to set effective risk and impact indicators [8].
The MITIGATE EU Project [12] introduces a collaborative, evidence-driven Maritime Supply Chain
Risk Assessment (MCSRA) approach for MLoSCs, which alleviates the limitations of state-of-the-art
risk management frameworks; (ii) The MITIGATE security assessment services use knowledge
management [55], open source intelligence techniques and social engineering to provide accurate and
updated information for vulnerabilities, threats and provide rule-based mechanisms to manipulate
the extracted knowledge and to generate attack paths; (iii) Mitigate builds the risk assessment
performance on an open simulation environment, which allows stakeholders to simulate risks and
evaluate risk mitigation actions; (iv) Represents and explores scenarios according to global supply
chain requirements; (v) Regarding risk assessment methods on SCADA systems, few approaches
provide system-asset analysis, vulnerabilities and countermeasures [8]. The MITIGATE methodology
applies a systematic asset-centric thorough model analysis in supply chain processes to define assets
interdependencies, address vulnerabilities, threats, individual, cumulative, propagated risks and their
cascading effects and indicate mitigation policies and payoffs; (vi) It is compliant with international
risk management standards and security frameworks (i.e., ISO 27k and ISO 28k family standards).
The demonstration of the simulated LNG scenario of SCADA components has shown that MITIGATE
security assessment services are applicable to ICT-based infrastructures and complex environments of
SCADA and AIS systems.
The report evaluates the internal and external results of user-tests for the MITIGATE system [64].
Internal and external tests were conducted for a period of 15 months. The tests have been divided into
two phases (internal and external) and carried out simultaneously in four countries: Greece, Spain,
Germany and Italy. During the internal phase, the MITIGATE system and its services were first tested
among port operators participants. In the external phase, the MITIGATE system was demonstrated to
external professionals (experts from Transport and Logistics enterprises and security consultants) who
evaluated and assessed the MITIGATE system and its corresponding services. Their comments and
suggestions have been collected. The feedback and experience gained have been continuously and
promptly passed on to the developers, who then incorporated it into system improvements.
Moreover, the tests sites reported in total the participation of 235 internal and 452 external
participants, mostly representatives from maritime, transport and logistics sectors, which are spread
over the individual test sites (Table 3).
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Table 3. Internal and External Test Participants per Country.
Country of the Test Site Number of Internal Participants Number of External Participants
Spain 50 32
Germany 39 32
Greece 108 375
Italy 38 13
A total of 113 non-technical and four technical questionnaires have been collected
(Figures 16 and 17). However, totally 18 of the respondents can be assigned an IT background based
on their positions they entered in the questionnaire, e.g., “SCADA/EMS Operator”, “Senior Software
Architect” or “Manager Network, Security & Infrastructure IT”. Furthermore, at least 16 respondents
can be assumed to have a security-related background, since “security” and/or “safety” is a part of
their job title, e.g., “PFSO” (“Port Facility Security Officer”), “Chief Security Officer” or “Head of Safety
and Security”. Summarizing, 34 out of 113 are considered to have IT or Security related knowledge.
Respondents answered questionnaires and provided their assessment using a 4-point Likert scale;
A. Strongly disagree; B. Disagree; C. Agree; D. Strongly agree.
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Additionally, almost a quarter of the respondents answered that they were unaware of to say if
an organization improves its compliance with security standards using MITIGATE. The majority of
the responders agreed (“strongly agree”: 52%, “agree”: 44%) that the MITIGATE-system provides
important decision support for improving the organizations’ risk situation (Figure 19). The 4% (of the
test users who did not agree with this statement seem to have done so at least in part because of the
development status of the prototypes: One of the comments pointed out implies that “the MITIGATE
system could provide important decision support”.
Concerning the overall impression of the MITIGATE system utility, as shown in (Figure 20): Over
78% of the test users responded positively that the required time for the MITIGATE RA is reasonable,
over 87% of the test users imply that they have felt comfortable using the MITIGATE-system, while
19% responded negatively that the MITIGATE system is easy to learn. Moreover, 64% strongly agreed
and 23% agreed that the MITIGATE system will help them to become more productive.
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Eventually, the internal and external testing phases have provided many recommendations and
suggestions for improvements to the developers. Much of the potential for improvement has already
been implemented in the subsequent releases during the test phase. The tests were able to successfully
provide feedback for the improvements of the system during the project period in terms of a target d
TRL (technology rea iness level) of 7, as well as for further dev lopment towards a finished product
or a TRL of 9.
8. Conclusions and Discussions
Maritime Logistics and Supply Chains (MLoSC) are composite interconnected systems playing a
vital role in the transportation, storage and delivery of goods and services. MLoSC services usually
involve various and multiple types of Critical Infrastructure, mainly in the transportation sector and
exhibit intra-sector and cross-border dependencies. This type of complex infrastructure is the SCADA
systems, which require the collaboration and interaction between supply chain stakeholders and their
cooperating assets to set effective risk and impact indicators [8]. The primary goal of MITIGATE
s o ass ss the i dividual, cumulative and propagated risk of an IT-based su ply chain, having in
mind the cyber interconnections and interdependencies between the various entities within an MLoSC.
MITIGATE assesses the threats affecting all the business partners involved in the MLoSC and estimates
the threats of the MLoSC as a whole via a collaborative environment. This helps to protect the expected
individual, cumulative and propagated risks within it. The derived risk values are used in order to
generate a baseline security strategy for MLoSCs, identifying the least necessary security controls for
each participant within the supply chain. T is enables MLoSC par icipant to fine-tune their security
strategies according to t eir business role as well as their dependencies.
It should be noted that in order to validate the MITIGATE methodology, case studies based on
real-world maritime scenarios and data were used. The evaluation results are promising, especially
considering the impact of previous versions on the results: A large majority of MLoSC stakeholders
consider the MITIGATE system to be efficient and useful in terms of its collaborative approach and
decision support for improving their organizations’ risk situation, having clearly organized information
and being equipped with all of the expected functionalities. The response to the question, if they are
satisfied with the system as a whole, is positive by a vast majority, which seems to be a good rating for
a prototype in the beta stage.
Consequently, this work illustrates that maritime, logistics and transport supply chain services
have common characteristics and face similar challenges concerning cybersecurity. In this context,
MITIGATE can meet their requirements and particularities. To this end, the MITIGATE system
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supports a number of security assessment services that can be used by various different, heterogeneous
MLoSC infrastructures of different types, sizes and business activities. This work has implemented
the risk assessment services on an indicative SCADA scenario and has proved that the MITIGATE
approach can be successfully applied to complex MLoSC systems, such as SCADA infrastructure,
can estimate effectively their cyber-risks and drive the risk mitigation actions.
However, the MITIGATE evidence-driven Risk Assessment methodology provides security
assessment services while considering only the cyber-nature of CPSs. Future work can be carried
out on the integration of incident management practices to estimate and handle the combination of
physical and cyber-risks on such infrastructure.
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